Attackers have a budget too.
A research practice and newsletter on the economics of attack and containment, from bots to agents and whatever comes after.
Attack Economics is a research practice and newsletter on the economics of attack and containment, from bots to agents and whatever comes after. The premise: security is never solved, only managed. The breach is inevitable; the only honest question is what it costs the attacker. Red-teaming's real role is pricing risk, not proving safety. Containment will fail. The work is making failure expensive, detectable, and slow.
Written by Antoine Juhasz, who writes about agent security, a field still taking shape. He has spent twenty years on the field-facing side of security across four technology waves (VoIP, CDN/WAF, DevSecOps, and now AI and agents), in roles spanning support, implementation, consulting, account management, and sales engineering.
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